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Introduction  
 
Following its election in 1997, the ‘New Labour’ government in the United 
Kingdom promoted the concept of regional devolution, leading to the creation 
of unelected Regional Assemblies in the English Regions. In 2002 the 
Government White Paper Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English 
Regions brought the prospect of elected Regional Assemblies to those 
English Regions that wanted them (see ODPM, 2004a). As in many other 
instances over the last sixty years, north-east England was intended to be the 
laboratory in which this experiment in a new form of regional policy was to be 
first conducted.  However, early in November 2004 the residents of the region 
decisively ejected – by a majority of 4 to 1 – proposals for an elected Regional 
Assembly. This event and the debate leading up to it provided the context and 
stimulus for this paper. The proposition that regional devolution in and of itself 
will lead to economic success has become deeply embedded in beliefs and 
policy discourses about the determinants of regional prosperity and in turn 
has lead to political demands for such devolution. In this paper I seek critically 
to examine such claims. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, there are a few 
introductory comments on concepts of power, regions, the reorganisation of 
the state and of multi-level governance, and governmentality, which can be 
used to help understand the issues surrounding regional devolution. Then I 
examine the ways in which north-east England was politically and socially 
constructed as a particular type of region, with specific problems, in the 1930s 
– a move that had lasting significance to the present day. Moving on some six 
decades, I then examine contemporary claims about the relationship between 
regional devolution and regional economic success, which find fertile ground 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a paper first prepared for the 30th Anniversary Conference of the 
Establishment of the Geography Institute, Roskilde University, “Geographies of Power, the 
Power of Geography”, Roskilde, October 26, 2004. Thanks to Jǿrgen Ole Bærenholdt, Ron 
Johnston, Ron Martin, Joe Painter and Viggo Plum for comments on an earlier version. The 
usual disclaimers apply.  
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in the north-east precisely because of its long history of representation as a 
region with a unified regional interest.  I then reflect on the processes of 
regional planning, regional strategies and regional devolution and their 
relationship to regional economic regeneration. A brief conclusion follows.  
 
 
Conceptual groundings  
 
Concepts of power  
 
Drawing on the work of Allen (1997, 2003, 2004), three concepts of power can 
be identified. These varying conceptions stress different aspects of power and 
the processes through which it is constituted and produced. Although Allen 
regards each of them as inadequate in some way, they nonetheless provide 
conceptual tools through which issues of regional devolution and devolution of 
power to regions can be interpreted.  
 
The first conception, drawing on critical realism, is a ‘centred’ one of power as 
an inscribed capacity of individuals or institutions, which possess power by 
virtue of their constitutive social relationships. It is located: that is, centred in 
agencies (individuals or organisations) as a consequence of the structure of 
these relationships.  As a result, these varied agencies acquire specific 
capacities that allow them to seek to secure desired outcomes. For example, 
the state can been seen as possessing power as a consequence of its 
relationship to capital and the requirement that it has a degree of relative 
autonomy from other social agents and classes. However, possession is not 
synonymous with the exercise of power. The capacity to exercise power and 
dominate - that is, control, command or direct the actions of others - is only 
realised contingently, under specific circumstances and conditions. Thus the 
ability to maintain power relations is inherently problematic, precisely because 
contexts and places are multiple and varied.  
 
Equating power with domination emphasises the asymmetries among those 
involved in power relations. Those exercising power can exert ‘power over’ 
those subject to the exercise of that power. As a result, outcomes are 
inherently unequal, with ‘winners’ gaining at the expense of ‘losers’. In this 
sense, this conception tends to conceive power relationships as zero-sum 
games, with only a fixed amount of power (and resources) in play. Whether 
the assumption of a fixed ‘lump of power’ is a necessary one in accounts 
informed by critical realism remains a moot point, however.  
 
The second conception of power is a ‘networked’ conception. Power is 
conceived as a resource for achieving diverse ends, emphasising ‘power to’ 
and the ways in which power is generated to achieve desired outcomes rather 
than how power constrains action. Power is not inherent in social relationships 
but, in contrast, is produced via mobilising resources to achieve particular 
goals. In this view, for example, the state develops power to act via the 
relationships and alliances that it forges with other social actors or 
stakeholders. This networked conception, with networks criss-crossing and 
overlapping, also raises the possibility that power is a fluid medium, variable 
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in amount depending on context rather than a fixed quantity. It suggests that 
the power of those enrolled in a network can be increased via their 
participation in it relative to non-participants, at least for as long as they 
remain members of the network. Whether all participants increase their power 
equally is another matter, however.  
 
The third conception of power is diagrammatic and Foucauldian. Power is 
conceived as a technology - a series of strategies, techniques and practices -
that works on subjects. It is exercised though groups or organisations rather 
than held or possessed or centred in them. Power is conceptualised as fluid 
and relational, exercised from innumerable points within civil society, the 
economy and the state – thus many agencies and institutions are involved 
within productive networks of power. The key issue is that of the techniques 
through which the conduct of others is moulded and their range of actions 
limited and processes of governing enacted ‘at a distance’. Thus power is 
seen as ‘productive’ as people are subjectively constituted via routinised and 
ritualised practices etched in disciplinary modes of power that have a 
hegemonic, unquestioned existence.  
 
The Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge and concept of power as fluid 
and relational emphasises state/civil society relations in systems of governing. 
The focus is not upon who has power or the right to know/not know (that is, on 
a search for a single universal locus of power) but upon ‘matrices of 
transformation’ and the complex diffusion and inter-relation of power 
throughout society. Nonetheless, Foucault privileged the role of the state (the 
“macro-physics of power”) as “the point of strategic codification of the 
multitude of power relations (“the micro-physics of power”) and the apparatus 
in which hegemony, meta-power, class domination and ‘sur pouvoir’ are 
organised” (Jessop, 1990, 239).  
 
Concepts of regions  
 
Essentialist conceptions of regions are no longer intellectually tenable. 
Regions are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. They are socially 
constructed, both discursively and materially, in relation to specific criteria, 
although political actors and particular interest groups may seek to define and 
defend them in essentialist terms. It is important to understand why this is so, 
not least in relation to arguments about regional devolution, in two respects: 
first, the constructions of regions as objects of policy; secondly, the 
construction of regions as subjects of policy and issues such as who claims 
the right to speak for the region, to define the region and its interests, 
prioritising some interests over others. As Councillor Bob Gibson, Vice Chair 
of the North East Assembly put it in September 2002: “The North East has a 
clear identity, geographically, culturally and historically. Of course there is 
much diversity within the region …[b]ut where necessary the region can come 
together and speak with one voice” (cited in Snapshot, September 2002). 
 
This recent re-thinking of the region is predicated upon a strongly relational 
approach: regions are seen as constituted from spatialized social relations, 
stretched out over space and materialised in various form, and 
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representational narratives about them (for example, see Amin, 2004). The 
spatiality of the dynamics of capitalism, the uneven geographies of their 
mechanisms of growth and decline and the stories told about them, represent 
one way of conceptualising the processes underlying the (re)construction of 
regions. Regions can be seen as products of complex condensations of social 
relationships, of varying density and variety, which combine contingently in 
specific time/space couplings to produce what are, in the last analysis, unique 
regions. The simultaneous combined and uneven development of particular 
regions reflects a shifting engagement with mechanisms of growth and 
decline as these are stretched over space in the flux of real historical time 
(Harvey, 1982). 
 
This relational approach therefore provides a way of thinking that discloses a 
region which is by no means necessarily a whole, with the characteristics of 
coherence which that term implies; nor is it necessarily a bounded and closed 
entity. Thinking about a region in terms of stretched out social relationships 
reveals a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations constructed through 
and around relations of power and inequality. It is a discontinuous lattice, 
punctured by structured exclusions, with intra-regional variation “because of 
the uneven nature of the overlay of different [defining] criteria” (Allen et al., 
1998, 55-6). Each relational network has its own spatial reach, which may not 
be coincident, although they may mutually influence one another. Intra-
regional heterogeneity and discontinuity implies that, metaphorically, the 
fabric of regions is torn and ragged. Consequently, the issue is not how and 
whether to draw lines around regions but to seek to understand the processes 
through which they are (re)produced (Hudson, 1990).  
 
Allen et al. (1998, 143) argue that an adequate understanding of regions can 
“only” come about through conceptualising them as open, discontinuous, 
relational and internally diverse. Furthermore, there is ample empirical 
evidence that, on average, the frequency, intensity and spatial reach of such 
extra-regional connections have tended to increase as the social relationships 
of capitalism have become more stretched and re-defined spaces in new 
ways. However, the density and geography of linkages can decline as well as 
increase in particular regions – for example, because of devalorisation and 
disinvestment decisions by transnational companies or political decisions to 
seek a greater degree of regional closure precisely because of the character 
of extra-regional relations, linkages and distanciated network relationships. 
Social and political actors often seek to increase the extent of regional closure 
and represent regions as closed, continuous and internally homogeneous 
and, as such, legitimate subjects seeking to shape policy. Consequently, 
while many of the social relations that help constitute regions traverse their 
immanent boundaries and enrol extra-regional actors in the process of 
regionalisation, these trans-boundary relationships may, in some cases, 
produce what may be termed “closure”.2      
 
                                                 
2 This is a slightly different, but more nuanced, interpretation of the links between “openness” 
and “closure” than I have previously argued (for example, see Hudson, 2001, Chapter 8). I am 
grateful to Joe Painter for suggesting it and emphasising that territoriality can be the effect of 
certain kinds of networked relationships.  
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Concepts of the reorganisation of the state and scalar shifts in modes of    
governing 
 
Drawing especially on recent changes in the European Union, Jessop (1997) 
refers to the “reorganisation” of the state as a triple process of de-nationalisation 
(hollowing out), de-statisation of the political system and the internationalisation 
of policy régimes. The extent to which regulation is carried out at sub-national 
scales is of particular relevance in the context of debates about devolution to 
regions. Such pressures ‘from below’ are generated by regionalist and 
nationalist movements, seeking to create more powerful sub-national spaces of 
governance and regulation within the boundaries of national states. However, 
national states are not innocent and passive by-standers in these processes of 
territorial decentralisation of power and/or responsibilities. For example, states 
may seek to preserve the integrity of their national territory via granting 
increased autonomy to regions within their boundaries or seek to contain fiscal 
crises by devolving responsibility (but not commensurate resources) for 
economic development to regions.  
 
These varied pressures have reinforced tendencies to shift regulatory practices 
from the national level and so bring about qualitative changes in relationships 
between national and regional levels. It is, however, important not to overstate 
the extent of such changes. There is a long-established sub-national territorial 
structure to state power in response to requirements for administrative efficiency 
and political legitimacy. Increasingly, however, there have also been pressures 
further to shift the power to shape policies for regions to the regional level. This 
involves decentralisation of the power to decide and resources to implement 
decisions rather than regions simply administering central government policies, 
which is intended to produce a greater correspondence between administrative 
spaces and the meaningful spaces of the regional life world. As a result, more 
complex architectures of political power and spaces of governing have emerged. 
 
As well as scalar shifts, there has been a change in emphasis from government 
to governance in systems of governing. Regulatory capacities have been shifted 
"outwards" to non-state organisations with enhanced significance placed upon 
social practices beyond the state. A range of organisations and institutions 
within civil society has been incorporated into processes of governance. This 
has been particularly associated with the promotion of network concepts and 
networked forms of regional governance (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003). The 
growing emphasis on governance is recognition of the increasing importance - 
or perhaps more accurately is increasing recognition of the importance - of the 
institutions of civil society in securing the conditions under which the economy is 
possible. It acknowledges the social constitution of the economy, the embedding 
of the economy in cultural forms and political arrangements. 
 
In summary, the reorganisation of the national state involves moving regulatory 
capacities between scales within state structures and outwards from the state 
into the institutions of civil societies and back into the economic institutions of 
markets. The concept of reorganisation denotes the emergence of new, more 
complicated structures of governing, involving re-defined relations between 
economy, society and state and complex links within multi-scalar systems of 
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governing. However, this does not resolve the problems stemming from crisis 
tendencies in state activity but transposes them to different spatial scales and 
into civil society or back into the economy. Moreover, national states retain a key 
role as “scale managers”, shaping decisions about scalar shifts in regulatory 
capacity, serving as centres of persuasion and authors of narratives about 
change and reform and centres of interpretation and dissemination of 
knowledge about experiences elsewhere (Peck, 2003, 357).  The critical issue is 
not the demise but the character of the national state, the type of regulatory 
régime that it maintains, the geometry of that régime and the extent to which it 
involves devolution to the regional scale, and the form of capitalist economy that 
it seeks to encourage.  
 
Concepts of governmentality  
 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality further illuminates the processes 
of reorganising the state and attempts to create the region as a political 
subject and the regional as a new scale of governing. While the emphasis on 
the national as the dominant space and spatial scale of regulation can be 
seen as expressive of one governmentality, the shift to concepts of multi-level 
governance and of re-defined boundaries between economy, civil society and 
state in the processes of governing can be seen as both indicative and 
constitutive of another governmentality. Not least, the spatial object of policy 
and the spaces of governing are seen to encompass more than just the 
national.  
 
Government can be defined as “any more or less calculated and rational 
activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a 
variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by 
working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite and 
shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, 
effects and outcomes”. A mentality might be described as “a condition of 
forms of thought and is thus not amenable to be comprehended from within its 
own perspective. The idea of mentalities, then emphasises the way in which 
the thought involved in the practices of government is collective and relatively 
taken-for-granted, that is, is not usually open to questioning by its 
practitioners'’ (Dean,1999, 11-16).  There are clear similarities to the doxic 
qualities of Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus and Gramsci’s (1971) 
concept of hegemony.  
 
Bringing ‘government’ and ‘mentality’ together, governmentality emphasises 
the how rather than the why questions and the structures of government and 
governing. Governmentality “is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, 
whose role is not one of weaving an all-pervasive web of ‘social control’, but 
of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse 
aspects of conduct through the countless, often competing, local tactics of 
education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and 
encouragement” (MacKinnon, 2000, 296). Moreover, such activities are 
territorially-demarcated. Space is an important element of governmentality 
because “to govern it is necessary to render visible the space over which 
government is to be exercised. And this is not simply a matter of looking: 
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space has to be re-presented, marked out” (Thrift, 2002, 205), emphasising 
that regions need to be defined, represented and marked out, as both objects 
and subjects of governing.  
 
This thereby locates the space of the region as one element in wider circuits 
of power and regards the specific activities of those acting as or for the region 
as themselves to be explained  - the black box of the region must be opened 
up to explain how it can perform as a political subject.  The creation of such a 
regional bloc can only be achieved through the successful realisation of 
specific regional projects that unite diverse social actors around a distinct line 
of action in the regional interest. However, achieving such unity is always a 
contingent matter. Even if it is achieved, however, there is no guarantee that 
such projects will always and only have their intended effects precisely 
because of the inability to anticipate the emergent properties of practices.  
 
The concept of governmentality has several significant consequences relating 
to issues of regions, regional policies and regional devolution. The first relates 
to the constitution of the objects, subjects and spaces of government. For 
example, regional economies are constituted via regional statistics, which 
have a key role in ‘making economies visible’ and constituting them as objects 
for policy action. Secondly, Latour (1987, 237-40) emphasises the key role of 
“centres of calculation”, critical nodes in which information on distant objects 
is brought together, compared, combined, and aggregated via use of 
mathematical and statistical techniques, thereby enabling government to ”act 
at a distance” on objects, such as regions, through its programmes and 
policies. Thirdly, it highlights “the specific mechanisms, procedures and tactics 
assembled and deployed as particular programmes are materialised” 
(MacKinnon, 2000, 295) and through which governmental programmes are 
activated and put into practice. Particular techniques and practices become 
governmental because they can be made practical, transformed into concrete 
devices for managing and directing reality. Inscription (for example, writing 
down agreed quantitative targets for regional economic growth) and 
calculation are key technologies, “responsibilising” and disciplining actors to 
the claims of central authority (Rose, 1996). These technologies render reality 
“stable, mobile, comparable, combinable”, enabling government to act on it 
(Rose, and Miller, 1992, 185).  
 
Such moves are not unproblematic, however. For example, there are tensions 
between decentralisation to regions and the development of new managerial 
technologies at national level to steer the activities of regional agencies and 
ensure that they deliver national policy objectives. Regional spaces become 
simultaneously objects and subjects of national government, and via “the 
combination of flexibility and standardisation (that is, different levels, same 
targets) … gives governmental technologies their utility as instruments for 
managing space” (MacKinnon, 2000, 309). However, granting a degree of 
autonomy to enable regions to become political subjects also creates the 
possibility of enclosure, an empowering capacity to resist the intentions of 
central government towards those regions as objects of its policies and create 
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capacity for the elaboration of alternative regional projects, indicative of the 
more general contradictory tendencies that plague state policies3.  
 
 
The case of north-east England: the construction of a region 
and the campaign for devolution  
 
Historical antecedents: constructing a new governmentality and the 
construction of north east England as a region in the 1920s and 1930s  
 
The dominant liberal mode of regulation on the Great Northern Coalfield in the 
four decades from the 1870s gave primacy to the market as a resource 
allocation mechanism, asserted the common interest of “masters and men”  
and restricted the role of the state to the establishment, maintenance and 
regulation of markets (Moore, 1974). The dominat organisations within these 
new arrangements were a small number of vertically-integrated coal 
combines, with  the bulk of their capital fixed within the region (Carney et al, 
1977; Hudson, 1989)4. However, these arrangements increasingly came 
under pressure, especially in the depression of the 1920s as the boom 
conditions of the war-time economy evaporated and export markets for coal, 
steel and ships collapsed. Increasingly, the existing mode of regulation 
became untenable, as the practices of governmentality in which it was 
grounded became fragile and contested. The majority of combine interests 
reacted in the same way. Locked into a liberal governmentality, the problem 
as they saw it was that the war had “distorted 'normal trade”, so the solution 
lay in restoring the previous mode of regulation, cutting wages and raising the 
number of hours worked.  This resulted in chronic mass unemployment. In the 
Liberal world this could only happen because the cuts were not severe 
enough. Thus the failure of the policy in practice resulted in its intensification.  
 
While there was an active search for 'new' solutions appropriate to the new 
conditions, especially after the general strike of 1926 when the dangers to 
social stability of single-minded wage cutting were amply demonstrated 
(especially to non-coal combine capitalist interests: Gilbert, 1976, Chapters 10 
and 11), in practice these made things worse. Influential members of 
combines in the north-east were appalled at the damage done to their 
interests (economic and political) by the failures of both the old mode of 
regulation and the politics of reaction that these failures set in motion in the 
1920s. By the early 1930s, therefore, the liberal mode of regulation and the 
                                                 
3 Rose and Miller (1992, 190) more generally argue that an unintended consequence of 
concentrations of expert knowledge is that they can give rise to “enclosures”, tightly bound 
sites of vigorously defended professional expertise, resistant to the wishes of government. 
4 Harvey (1917) coined the term ‘coal combine’ to denote capitalist enterprises rooted in the 
‘coal economy’ that had diversified into other activities and were linked into oligopolistic 
groupings that dominated economy and politics in the region. In addition, they were 
connected by non-economic relationships, including those of family, friendship, and shared 
religion. This puts the recent emphasis upon the importance of such linkages and “untraded 
inter-dependencies” (discussed below) into historical context and emphasises the dangers of 
confusing changes in thought about the economy with changes in the economy itself (cf. Hall, 
1991). 
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conception of governmentality in which it was embedded were shattered but it 
was unclear as to what might replace them.  
 
By the mid-1930s, however, there was evidence of an emergent alternative 
governmentality and a considerable commitment in the north-east to search 
for a new mode of regulation and new policies, to explore the possibilities for 
capital in selective state intervention and protectionism to defend ‘regional 
interests’. Capitalist interests succeeded in bringing about two critical and 
related developments: the definition and “making visible” of the north-east as 
a region, and as a particular sort of “problem region”; and the shaping of 
emergent forms of state policy to address those problems, the transition from 
a liberal to interventionist mode of regulation as an integral part of creating a 
new governmentality regarding relationships between capital and the state 
and the objects of state policy (Carney and Hudson, 1978; Hudson 1989; 
Hudson, 2005). Chambers of Commerce, as collective representatives of 
capital, played a key role in this.  Since  the capital represented in the 
Chambers was mainly tied up within the region, they realised the possibilities 
of representing their problems as a regional problem and seeking to resolve 
them as such. The coal combines argued the need to ensure that conditions 
for continued capital accumulation in the region were reproduced, while 
representing this as in the regional interest. Consequently, they sought to 
construct a new governmentality, incorporating an interventionist mode of 
regulation that would re-define the relationship between capital and state, 
define the region as an object of regional policy, accord a central role to the 
state in attracting new industries and install the representatives of the 
combines as key actors in the new state institutions that would administer the 
new regional policies.  
 
By the mid-1930s, therefore, combine and allied interests had successfully 
prosecuted a political strategy that made the case for new and radically 
different policies. The establishment of a Commissioner for the Special Areas 
in England and Wales in 1934 signalled that national government accepted 
the need for a major policy shift, defining and representing “Special Areas” as 
objects of state policy that could be acted on “at a distance”. This was a shift 
in the dominant conception of governmentality that was to have wider 
consequences as regions became the objects of specific regional policies. 
Within the region, the formation, in 1935, of the North East Development 
Board (NEDB) was equally significant. Its initial aim was to allow "the 
exchange of opinions and concerted action on non-party lines by 
representatives of a great variety of interests who have no other common 
meeting ground."  As such, the Board sought to broaden the class basis of 
support for the new regional development policies and construct it on a cross-
class regionalist basis. By 1938, its membership included several Labour 
Members of Parliament, many local authority representatives and several 
trade unionists and members of the Industrial Advisory Council as the NEDB 
claimed the right to speak for the region and promote its interests. 
 
The policy tentatively adopted by the NEDB was elaborated in 1943 by the 
Northern Industrial Group (NIG). The Group, the membership of which bore 
more thana passing resemblance to the NEDB, was formed to discuss the 
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problems that would arise on the “reconversion” from a war-time to a 
peace-time economy in the region. The NIG’s publication "Considerations 
Affecting PostWar Employment in the North East" emphasised that state 
intervention would be necessary to facilitate the short-period “'reconversion” of 
the regional economy to peace-time production. Indeed, it assumed that such 
intervention ought to occur and be instrumental in achieving economic and 
social ends, not least by attracting inward investment to diversify the economy 
and help guarantee “full employment” in the region and the stem out-migration 
from it. The Group also had a clear view as to the form that such state 
intervention should take, based upon the wartime experience of its members 
in positions of executive power in the state apparatus. These experiences 
further increased support for the transition to an interventionist mode of 
regulation of the economic and social life in the region. This marked shift from 
the old Liberal fear of state intervention reflected the confidence of its private 
sector proponents that they could shape the activities of the state to their own 
requirements while representing these as in the general regional interest. 
 
This was further confirmed when the NIG circulated its November 1944 
"Memorandum on the Government White Paper on Employment Policy”. The 
White Paper suggested that in Development Areas there would be regionally 
organised branches of central Government Departments concerned with 
industrial location policy. The Group Memorandum responded to these 
proposals as follows: "We would like to emphasise strongly that success 
depends upon quick decision and that this will not be obtained unless the 
various Government Departments in Whitehall delegate full authority to their 
regional representatives”. However, this administrative decentralisation would 
be ineffective unless other changes were made. The Group considered it "to 
be of vital importance that the Government regional organisation should have 
effective executive responsibility" and that such an organisation should "... 
maintain close contact with and be advised by a parallel group representing 
employers, employees and other interests in the area. The Northern Industrial 
Group and the North East Development Association because of their widely 
representative character and the work which they are already carrying out, 
can advise in many ways any Government regional organisation which may 
be established" (NIG, 1944, 11, my emphasis).  
 
This radical change in the conception of the most appropriate governmentality 
and mode of regulation, incorporating an enhanced form of devolution to the 
region, clearly reflected the perception by the NIG that it had successfully 
prosecuted political strategies that secured the interests of private capital in 
the north-east, and had succeeded in defining these as synonymous with the 
general regional interest. The enrolment of trades union leaders and Labour 
Members of Parliament into the coalition reflected their perception, grounded 
in a reformist Labourist politics, that this offered the best (or perhaps more 
accurately least bad and only possible) option of securing employment for 
their members and constituents. Seeking to create a sense of a shared 
regional interest involved attempting to ensure that the “spatial reaches” of 
economic, political and cultural processes coalesced to form the boundaries of 
the region – or at least were widely perceived to do so – conferring a 
distinctive and shared north-eastern identity to those that lived within these 
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common boundaries. Moreover, this establishment of a cross-class regionalist 
project had an enduring effect over the next sixty years of development 
policies in and for the region as it became a ‘state managed region’ (Hudson, 
1989). It can be seen as the predecessor of a succession of regional plans 
and development strategies, grounded in a cross-class consensus as to what 
was ‘good for the region’, and administered by the ‘usual suspects’ within the 
state, private sector companies and organisations and the trades unions, 
typically male and middle aged (Robinson et al. 2000).  
 
Crucially, however, these remained regionalisations of central government 
policies and initiatives, an administrative devolution rather than one that 
devolved the power to act, the power to decide on policy and commensurate 
resources to enable regional organisations to implement their policy choices 
(see Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003). In so far as business concerns in the 
region felt that they were able to secure their interests via these arrangements 
they were content to rest with administrative devolution, as were those in the 
local political elites and dominant strata who were satisfied that these 
arrangements helped secure their own power and influence within the region. 
However, the lack of political devolution and meaningful transfer of powers 
and resources to make policy and decisions within the region continued to 
rankle with other regional politicians and fractions of political strata in the 
region. 
 
 
Sixty years on: regional economic success stories and contemporary 
arguments for regional devolution  
 
During the 1980s voices began to be raised arguing for constitutional reform, 
decentralising some power to elected regional assemblies, as a way of 
tackling more effectively problems of unemployment, inequality and poverty in 
the region (Byrne, 1990). During the 1990s these voices became more 
numerous. The contemporary case for a Regional Assembly in the north-east 
has been informed by a variety of arguments, many of which are shared by 
Cabinet Ministers and powerful political voices within the north-east. They 
may be summarised as follows.  First, devolution would also bring benefits in 
terms of new forms of participative democracy, greater political accountability 
and transparency in the policy making process within the region. An elected 
Regional Assembly would eliminate the democratic deficit created by its 
unelected predecessor and bring a new style of politics, centred on 
partnership and stakeholder engagement. Secondly, existing forms of top 
down regional economic policy, through which central government acted at a 
distance on the region, had manifestly failed and been rendered obsolete by 
the neo-liberal globalising economy. This made the north-east an attractive 
space for those seeking to promote concepts of devolution that went beyond 
existing forms of administrative devolution. Thirdly, an elected assembly 
would strengthen the position of the north-east in the competition for inward 
investment and associated new employment.  The north-east, along with the 
other English Regions, has from 1999 had its own Regional Development 
Agency, ONE NorthEast, but this is seen as weak and lacking political 
legitimacy, financial resources and powers. Fourthly, those regions in the late 
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modern world of the European Union and the USA that have been successful 
in making the transition to a ‘high road’ of economic development, regional 
economic ‘success stories’ such as Baden-Württemberg, the Third Italy and 
Silicon Valley, are characterised by devolved forms of governance and 
regulation and this is seen as causally related to their economic success.  
 
Critically, the stories told about these regions have led to claims – more 
accurately assertions – that regional economic success is based upon two 
conditions that are seen as both necessary and sufficient: first, that of a 
devolved political system, so that regions form a scale or layer in a system of 
multi-level governance; secondly, that the governance system extends 
beyond the state to encompass a range of organisations and institutions 
located in civil society. Together, these state and non-state institutions interact 
and coalesce to form supportive and enabling regional institutional formations, 
registered in concepts such as ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994), 
‘untraded interdependencies’ (Storper, 1995) or ‘learning regions’ (Morgan, 
1995). Consequently, it is claimed that in order to be economically successful 
in the neo-liberal world regions must become pro-active subjects responsible 
for their own developmental trajectory and fate rather than simply passive 
objects of central state policies. Moreover the role of the central state is to 
recognise and facilitate this by devolving power and resources to regions as 
political actors (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003). 
 
This understanding of the determinants of regional economic success has led 
to normative claims that other regions, especially marginalized and peripheral 
regions such as north-east England, must become part of devolved political 
systems and develop such regionally-specific organisational and institutional 
formations if they are to improve their economic fortunes. For some this is 
simply a necessary condition, recognising that regions remain open 
constructions subject to a variety of externally originating forces. For others, 
however, necessity slides into sufficiency and leads to regionalist claims that 
regional devolution guarantees regional economic success, based upon a 
simplistic causal model but legitimated and given credibility by appeals to the 
re-organisation of the state thesis and a particular and partial interpretation of 
regional success stories. 
 
However, at this point it is important to enter a caveat about these success 
stories. Whilst some herald them as egalitarian and progressive 
developmental models, others see them in a very different light. For example, 
Hadjimichalis and Papamichos (1990) argue that the economic success of 
much of the Third Italy was grounded in regressive gender divisions of labour 
and patriarchal arrangement that forced women and children to work for long 
hours, sometimes through the night, in poor working conditions. Often the 
basis of profitability was the exploitation of immigrant labour. Similarly it is 
worth recalling that in regions such as Baden-Württemberg, California and 
much of the Third Italy migrant workers form a substantial proportion of the 
labour force, with many illegal immigrants or on legal migrants on fixed-term 
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contracts renewable (or not) on an annual basis. This hardly smacks of a 
socially progressive developmental model to be emulated elsewhere5.  
 
This emphasises the need to be cautious and critical of the way the regions 
and regional success are conceptualised and presented. Clearly, as noted 
above, there has been a considerable debate about this in recent years. 
Regions and the criteria against which regional success is to be gauged are 
social and political constructions. As such, different social groups and 
fractions seek to claim the right to speak for the region, to define success in 
particular ways, and typically in the process seek to present a sectional or 
particularistic interest as the regional interest. Thus those who seek to argue 
for regional devolution typically do not do so in a disinterested way or in a way 
that seeks to promote some universal regional interest but as part of a 
strategy to advance particular interests as the regional interest. For example, 
fractions of the political strata see regional devolution and devolved regional 
institutions as a way of promoting particular political projects and interests 
while others seek to oppose them precisely because they would be inimical to 
their interests. Nor is this a new process. As illustrated above, in the 1930s 
representatives of major capitalist interests in north-east England sought to 
construct a particular representation of the region as problematic and argue 
for state policy solutions to address these problems precisely as a way of 
seeking to protect and promote their own interests as owners of capital. In 
analogous fashion the policies of the Regional Development Agency created 
in 1999 are strongly shaped by business interests – and this is clearly one 
reason for the opposition of business leaders to the proposed elected 
Regional Assembly, which would have taken responsibility for the regional 
development agenda and management of the regional economy. As the 
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott recently put it in discussing the RDAs: 
“We made them business-led. We represented their interests and what they 
are fighting to keep now is the RDAs” (cited in Blitz and Tighe, 2004). 
 
 
Towards a critique of regional devolution, regional planning and 
regional strategies in north-east England 
 
As the most recent Index of Multiple Deprivation data (ODPM, 2004b) make 
dramatically clear, much of the north-east remains blighted by very high levels 
of multiple deprivation despite – or perhaps because of – its history of 
planning and state involvement. Actively addressing the needs of most people 
living in the north-east, but in particular those of its most disadvantaged 
residents, would therefore require more radical changes than implied by a 
degree of constitutional reform and regional devolution directly to confront 
questions of power and control over the production and distribution of goods 
and services. In this, the relationship between private capital and the 
institutions of central, regional and local government would need to be 
examined, as would their relationship to dominant social groupings in the 
                                                 
5 Indeed, the recent (2004) industrial unrest in Baden-Württemberg, especially in the 
automobile plants of Chrysler-Daimler, is indicative of the limits to such a developmental 
model. 
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region. For a few years in the 1950s and 1960s it looked as if the interests of 
capital, the state and a majority of working people and their families could be 
made to seem compatible in the region via state planning, but it soon became 
clear that this was an illusion. Planning in this context meant at best a weak 
form of indicative planning - a mixture of carrot and stick, through which the 
state attempted to persuade or bribe private capital to behave in certain ways. 
There were only limited controls on private capital, and certainly no powers to 
make it do anything other than what it perceived to be in its best interests. 
Consequently, attempts to persuade capital to behave in line with the 
projections of state indicative plans were a dismal failure.  
 
Where there was formal state control, via nationalisation, things were little 
better and expansionist plans very soon became translated into 
uncoordinated plant closures, job cuts and crisis management as the 
experience of nationalisation proved disastrous for the north-east. This is not 
to argue that public ownership per se should be rejected but rather to 
acknowledge that the particular form adopted - in particular the nationalised 
industry - ought to be. Rather than becoming a mechanism for more rational 
industrial planning advancing the interests of the majority of the population of 
workers and consumers, nationalised industries became state-controlled 
companies promoted a savage form of restructuring that paid scant regard to 
the sensitivities of people in their places. However, to argue that all economic 
planning - in the ex-ante sense of making decisions about the allocation of 
output ahead of production - is rendered impossible by the deepening of the 
social divisions of labour to the point where this takes on causal powers 
independent, and beyond the reach, of the social relations of production 
(Sayer and Walker, 1992, pp. 224-30) is overly pessimistic. To dismiss all 
alternatives to an ex-post validation of production via the market simply 
because of the collapse of the command economies of the USSR and its 
former Eastern European satellite states is to go too far. History in this sense 
is not yet at an end. There may well be feasible possibilities for more rational 
economic planning that are sensitive to the specificities of regions such as 
north-east England – especially if there is some re-conceptualisation of ‘the 
economy’ and what it denotes. Certainly, discovering and constructing them 
remains a task to be undertaken but that is a very different matter from an a 
priori ruling of such possibilities from the agenda.  
 
However, as of now they are very far from that agenda and denying this would 
carry grave political dangers. The political strategies of the last sixty years in 
and for the north-east prioritised the interests of big capital and central 
government over those of local communities, local people, workers and their 
families. If the interests of the latter are to be prioritised, then a radical change 
in political priorities will be required as well as in the spatial formation of 
politics in the UK and the UK state (Amin et al, 2003). This may involve a 
greater degree of regional devolution as a necessary condition but this in itself 
can never be sufficient.  From the perspective of what we might term the 
fallacy of the lump of power, regional devolution can be seen in terms of an 
essential and finite quantity of power, which remains centred in the state, but 
some of which is re-allocated and devolved from the central (national) state to 
regions. Thus power is devolved but on terms decided by the central state. In 
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Foucauldian terms, there are micro-circuits of power widely diffused within 
civil society, economy and state but the national state retains a key privileged 
macro-scale role; decisions as to what to devolve and what targets devolved 
regional government must meet continue to be decided in the centre.  
 
Attempts to create networked forms of power in and for the region, building on 
the long history of collaboration between social classes and groups within the 
region around a regional agenda, have been demonstrably inadequate in 
seeking to confront the structural power of capital and the structural 
imperative upon the national state to subordinate interests located within the 
region to the national interest and the dependency of the state upon the 
accumulation process. Moreover, such networks characterised by 
asymmetrical power relations within them, pre-date social scientists thinking 
about governance and policy in network terms (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 
2003). Indeed the construction of networked forms of power in the region has 
both reflected and reinforced the position of those possessing structural 
power rather than empowering the multitude in the region.  
 
The issue therefore is not whether devolved government can create power in 
and for the region but the limits that the relationships between capital, the 
state and civil society impose upon the scope and content of state activity – 
whether at national or regional scale – and the interests that are prioritised in 
state policy agendas as the state seeks to navigate the perilous path between 
the dangers of accumulation and legitimation crises. In this context, the switch 
from an emphasis on (albeit weak indicative) regional planning to regional 
strategies (ONE NorthEast, 1999) is more than simply semantic. Above all, it 
registers the dominance of a neo-liberal governmentality in which the best that 
can be imagined for regions such as the north-east is to ride with the tide of 
neo-liberal globalisation, and seek to adapt the region to capture some mobile 
capital investment and low grade, poorly qualified jobs in competition with 
other regions (and cities and national territories) globally on the low road to 
regional development. The region then becomes the political subject that 
negotiates this engagement with processes of neo-liberal globalisation and 
the region’s place within them.  
 
There is no doubt that a minority in the region, predominantly drawn from 
particular political strata and social classes, would continue to deploy the 
rhetorical devices of the region and its interests as a way of protecting and 
promoting their interests in this global context. There is a long history of this 
and no doubt it would continue to be the case were there to be an elected 
Regional Assembly and more devolved forms of regional governing. Whether 
much would change for the better for the vast majority of people living in the 
region remains a moot point. For example, the post-devolution experiences of 
Scotland and Wales suggest that the harshest impacts of neo-liberal 
globalisation can be softened at the margins but that there is scant scope to 
alter the economic development trajectories of these territories for the better. 
Therefore there are manifest political dangers in pinning the argument for 
regional devolution to the mast of regional economic success. This is only 
likely to lead – once again - to unrealised expectations and disappointment, 
discrediting the concept of devolution per se and cutting the ground from 
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beneath the other to-be-welcomed ways in which the concept of greater 
political devolution and regional accountability could enhance life in peripheral 
regions. There is a need for eternal vigilance to guard against the danger of 
allowing the pursuit of the Holy Grail of regional economic renewal and revival 
via regional devolution to become the device through which the central state 
shifts the blame onto the victim for the continuing economic problems of 
peripheralised regions. The rejection of the offer of an elected Assembly in the 
north-east suggests that a majority of residents of the region are alert to these 
issues.  
 
At a minimum, prioritising the interests of the vast majority of people in the 
north-east would involve establishing a different conception of planning, and 
effecting a radical change in socio-economic priorities and in the mode of 
regulation and dominant governmentality. Whether this is feasible remains, at 
best, an open question. It may well be, to borrow Offe’s (1975) evocative 
phrase, the case that the impossible may be necessary and the necessary 
impossible in terms of creating powers and resources at regional level that 
would allow an effective determination of the regional economic development 
trajectories that challenged the imperatives of capital accumulation. Maybe it 
is no longer feasible even to think of national, or even supranational, 
regulatory regimes which would allow effective planning via significant 
influence over, let alone control of, private capital's (dis)investment decisions, 
and even less the socialisation of key sectors of the economy. Perhaps there 
is no effective alternative to the disciplinary powers of the market and the law 
of value in determining the fate the regions – for better or, almost certainly, 
worse. If so, it is better, though painful, to recognise this so that people in 
areas such as the north-east can better understand the sort of future they face 
and make their choices accordingly and not raise yet more false hopes on the 
back of devolutionist assertions and claims about transferring power to the 
region.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
As I have illustrated, concepts such as those of power, state re-organisation 
and governmentality are helpful in understanding the developmental trajectory 
of north-east England, especially once this is located in the conceptualisation 
of the region as a discursive as well as a material construction. In this context, 
the proposals for an elected Regional Assembly can be seen as expressive of 
an emergent neo-liberal governmentality, incorporating multi-level forms of 
governance, seeking to unite diverse social classes and groups around a 
common regionalist project. These proposals drew on a long history of cross-
class collaborative projects, which claimed to represent “the regional interest”, 
and of administrative devolution whereby central government policies for the 
region were executed by a small cadre in the region.  
 
However, questions remain about the efficacy of the new governmentality and 
about who would be its main beneficiaries in the region – and the rejection of 
the offer of an elected Assembly suggests that these are not simply academic 
concerns. The extent to which devolution would actually involve transferring 
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power to the region and the capacity of networked forms of power within the 
region to counter the structural power of capital and shape central state 
policies remains unclear. Not least, the key players in the new forms of 
devolved government would be substantially the same as in the previous 
forms of devolution – that is, the ‘usual suspects’ drawn from business and 
political elites in the region. Issues relating to asymmetries in power and the 
ability of different social classes and groups within the region to realise their 
interests would remain opaque. What is clear is that any notion of the region 
as a unified and coherent political subject pursuing policies (for example, via 
an elected Assembly) to further a shared regional interest is untenable. The 
recent re-thinking of the region allows an escape from the limitations of the 
myth of a unified (and unifying) regional interest and explicitly acknowledges 
the existence of different – and at times openly competitive, grounded in 
different class structural positions and sources of power – interests held by 
individuals and social groups living in the same space. Within such an 
agonistic politics, which interests prevail and which are prioritised in state 
policy agendas is the outcome of overtly political struggle based on a 
recognition of difference – albeit a difference often grounded in structurally 
asymmetrical power relations - rather than a presumption of homogeneity of 
interest on the basis of a shared regional identity. A consequence of this is 
that defining regional economic success becomes problematic, since this 
cannot be divorced from distributional issues of equity within the region. What 
can be safely stated is that, at a minimum, realising such alternative 
conceptions of development will require a lot more than simply some limited 
devolution of political power within the structures of the state and systems of 
multi-level and multi-scalar governing. But that must remain the subject of a 
different paper …. 
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